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English Historical Demography and the Nuptiality 
Conundrum: New Perspectives 
Steven King* 
Abstract: In the last decade, nuptiality has been placed at 
the centre of the English demographic regime in the long 
eighteenth-century. Proto-industrial areas in particular are 
increasingly seen to have experienced substantial decline in 
the female age at first marriage during this period, helping 
to fuel substantial population growth. This article uses 
family reconstitution and other data to question the 
uniformity of this experience and to suggest new avenues 
of interpretation rather than simply observation. For 
Calverley in West Yorkshire, England, female marriage 
ages remained stable throughout the proto-industrialisation 
process. More significantly, the distribution of marriage 
ages around the mean was much narrower than similar 
measures elsewhere. The article suggests that kinship, a 
deep sentiamental and practical attachment to land, and an 
early retirement system lay behind this experience. 
I 
In 1981 Tony Wrigley and Roger Schofield's The population history of 
England1 established nuptiality at the heart of the English demographic system. 
Using data from twelve family reconstitutions they suggested that female age at 
first marriage in England declined by roughly three years between the mid 
* Address all communications to Steven King, Oxford Brookes University, Gipsy Lane 
Campus, Headington Oxford OX3 OBP. 
The research for this article was carried out for a joint project with Professor Pat 
Hudson of the University of Cardiff, and the author. The project as a whole has been 
supported by grants from the ESRC, British Academy, the Scouloudie Foundation 
and the University of Liverpool. Writing was conducted at the University of Trier 
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1 E. A. Wrigley and R. S. Schofield, The population history of England 1541-1871: a 
reconstruction (London, 1981). 
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seventeenth and early nineteenth centuries. The effect of opening up three of 
the most fertile years of the female reproductive life cycle, combined with 
small movements in marital fertility and larger rises in illegitimacy, meant that 
two thirds of English population growth in the period 1650-1830 reflected 
changes in fertility, leaving a relatively small role for mortality.2 In contrast to 
many of our European neighbours, then, eighteenth-century England had a 
relatively 'low pressure' nuptiality dominated demographic regime rather than 
a 'high pressure' mortality dominated system.3 A promise of more detailed 
local work to follow augured well for English historical demography. 
The 1997 publication of new data from the Cambridge Group based upon 
twenty six family reconstitutions, as well as the reworking of figures for 
population totals,4 assuaged some of the criticism of their 1981 findings and 
confirmed England as the most demographically distinctive country in Europe.5 
The centrality of fertility to the English demographic experience was 
confirmed, even enhanced by the finding that marital fertility rose by roughly 
10 per cent between the mid-seventeenth and early nineteenth-centuries. 
However, age at marriage remained the key demographic variable in this 
context. For women the average age at first marriage fell from 26 in 1700-09 to 
23.1 in 1830-37, while that for men fell from 27.4 to 24.9. During the key 
period of population take-off after 1750, the decline was more or less constant 
for men. For women marriage ages remained stationary (at age 24) between 
1780 and 1809, but the overall fall in female marriage ages in this period was 
sufficient to yield a minimum increase of 20 per cent in the number of children 
born to a women who married at the average age and remained married until 
the end of her childbearing period. As Goldstone noted of Wrigley and 
Schofield's 1981 analysis, much of this fall in the female age at marriage is to 
2 For a concise review of the 1981 findings, see E. A. Wrigley and R. S. Schofield, 
'English population history from family reconstitution: summary results 1600 -1799 ' 
Population Studies 37 (1983), 157-84 . 
3 For comparative material see J. Knodel, Demographic behaviour in the past: a study 
of 14 German village populations in the eighteenth and nineteenth-century 
(Cambridge, 1988). 
4 See E. A. Wrigley, R. S. Davies, J. E. Oeppen and R. S. Schofield, English 
population history from family reconstitution 1580-1837 (Cambridge, 1997). Also, 
R. S. Schofield, 'British population change 1 7 0 0 - 1 8 7 1 ' in R. Floud and D. 
McCloskey (eds), The economic history of Britain since 1700, volume I (Cambridge, 
1994), 6 0 - 9 5 . 
5 Three of the most piercing critiques were provided by P. Lindert, 'English living 
standards, population growth and Wrigley and Schofield' Explorations in Economic 
History 20 (1983), 3 3 - 6 4 , J. Goldstone, 'The demographic revolution in England: a 
reexamination' Population Studies 40 (1986), 5 - 3 4 , and P. Razzell (ed), Essays in 
English population history (Chichester, 1994). For an initial response to the critics 
emphasising that the 1981 volume was an exercise in pushing back methodological 
boundaries as much as generating concrete results, see R. S. Schofield, 'Through a 
glass darkly: the Population History of England as an experiment in history' Journal 
of Interdisciplinary History 15 (1985), 5 7 1 - 9 4 . 
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be explained by a sharp decline in the number and proportion of brides 
marrying above thirty, and a more than commensurate rise in the number 
marrying at or around the age of twenty.6 The rate of marriage can be less 
satisfactorily discerned from reconstitution results, but it seems clear that the 
generation born around 1700 could expect to see roughly eleven per cent of 
their number unmarried by the time they reached forty-five. This figure had 
fallen to only five per cent for the generation born at mid-century. 
Non-marriage then rose more or less consistently, reaching eleven per cent 
again for the generation born in the early nineteenth-century.7 In other words, 
during the key decades of population explosion in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, marriage ages were tumbling and the number of women 
taken out of the fertility equation by celibacy was at its lowest point.8 
Moreover, the twenty six reconstitutions suggested some important 
relationships between socio-economic variables and nuptiality at community 
level. In terms of the level of marriage ages at any point in time, there was 
considerable variation. Communities which were to later become rural 
industrial appear to have started the eighteenth-century with relatively high 
marriage ages, for instance, while agrarian communities serving large urban 
areas appear to have had relatively low marriage ages from the same date. By 
the opening of the nineteenth century the differences in absolute level had 
narrowed, but even during the period 1800-37 the difference between the 
lowest and highest female marriage ages was five years. In terms of trend, the 
fall was faster and further in rural industrial communities and other areas which 
saw a shake up in the local economy during the course of the 
eighteenth-century, as Levine had contended in 1977.9 Mining areas also 
appear to have experienced rapidly falling female marriage ages, while decline 
in rural areas was slower but still pronounced.10 Yet, with the exception of areas 
such as Terling, which had been held in the commercial grasp of London for a 
6 Interestingly, there was an intimate connection between falling female marriage ages 
and rising marital fertility, with youthful brides having children at a faster rate than 
older brides. J. Goldstone, "The demographic'. 
7 These are 'national' estimates calculated as an adjunct to back projection. At the level 
of individual reconstitutions, female non-marriage can only be detected very roughly 
by looking at the numbers of single women buried, while that for men cannot be 
gauged at all. The figures provide support for David Weir's argument that it was 
changes in the rate of non-marriage, rather than changes in the ages of those who did 
marry, which drove population increase between 1700 and 1750. See D. Weir, 
'Rather never than late: celibacy and age at marriage in English cohort fertility, 
1 5 4 1 - 1 8 7 1 ' Journal of Family History 9 (1984), 340 -54 . 
8 E. A. Wrigley et al, English population. 
9 D. Levine, Family formation in an age of nascent capitalism (New York, 1977). 
1 0 M. R. Haines, 'Fertility, nuptiality and occupations: a study of coal mining 
populations and regions in England and Wales in the mid nineteenth century' in T. R. 
Rabb and R. Rotberg (eds), Industrialisation and urbanisation (Princeton, 1981), 
101-36 . 
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considerable time, almost all family reconstitution communities appear to have 
experienced common downward trends in female marriage ages. By 
highlighting these broad characteristics Wrigley et al have finally laid to rest 
many of the quantitative ghosts which have haunted the discipline of English 
historical demography for decades. While English sources for the study of 
population pale into insignificance when compared to those in other parts of 
Europe, the systematic evaluation of reconstitution results together with other 
advances in the consideration of family history and kinship in England now 
make it one of the best documented of all European states." 
II 
Yet, English population history from family reconstitution also highlights the 
persistent weaknesses of English historical demography and suggests how 
much more remains to be done. 1 2 The issue of how to conceptualise the place of 
urban demography within a 'national' framework based upon rural areas and 
small market towns remains to be solved, for instance.1 3 Moreover, while the 
criticisms of reconstitution techniques advanced by Ruggles can be seen to be 
flawed, the basic problems of method and representativeness in family 
reconstitution have not gone away. 1 4 Twenty six reconstitutions is an 
1 1 See for instance R. Wall, 'Elderly persons and members of their households in 
England and Wales from Pre-industrial times to the present' in D. I. Kertzer and P. 
Laslett (eds), Aging in the past: demography, society and old age (Berkley, 1994), 
8 1 - 1 0 6 and P. Laslett, 'The family as a knot of individual interests' in R. Netting, R. 
Wilk and J. Arnould (eds), Households: comparative and historical studies of the 
family group (Berkley, 1984), 3 5 3 - 7 9 , and D. Cressey, 'Kinship and kin interaction 
in early modern England' Past and Present 113 (1986), 3 8 - 6 9 . 
12 See also W. Seccombe, Weathering the storm: working class families from the 
industrial revolution to the fertility decline (London, 1993). 
1 3 See G. Kearns, 'The urban penalty and the population history of England' in A. 
Brandstrom and L. G. Tedebrand (eds), Society, health and population during the 
demographic transition (Umea, 1986), 2 1 3 - 3 6 and N. Goose, 'Urban demography in 
pre-industrial England: what is to be done ?' Urban History 21 (1994), 2 7 3 - 8 4 . Also 
C. Galley, 'A model of early modern urban demography' Economic History Review 
68 (1995), 4 4 8 - 6 9 . 
1 4 S. Ruggles, 'Migration, marriage and mortality: correcting sources of bias in English 
family reconstitutions' Population Studies 46 (1992), 5 0 7 - 2 2 and E. A. Wrigley, 'The 
effects of migration on the estimation of marriage age in family reconstitution 
studies' Population Studies 48 (1994), 8 1 - 9 7 . R. Lesthaege, 'On the social control of 
human reproduction' Population and Development Review 6 (1980), 1-29, argues 
convincingly that the social, cultural, economic and kinship profile of those who left 
was very different from that of those who remained. In terms of method, 
reconstructing family trees involves using rules to link events which rely entirely on 
the demographic logic of the life-cycle itself rather than reference to external sources 
to justify the link. See S. A. King, 'Lives, life cycles and historical demography: new 
perspectives' History and Computing 8 (1996), 3 4 - 6 2 . 
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impressive feat, but represents a tiny proportion of English communities. 
Larger populations and key areas such as eighteenth century Lancashire still 
require much investigation, and communities with very different demographic 
experiences to the 'national' picture certainly wait to be discovered.15 On these 
issues, Wrigley et al provide a well-considered agenda for future research. 
In other ways, the development of English historical demography has been 
less satisfactory. Calls by Bridget Hill and Alison Mackinnon for the 
motivations of women rather than men to be 'rediscovered' and placed at the 
centre of the demographic stage were not addressed by Wrigley et al. 1 6 Indeed, 
there was no sub-community level analysis of the twenty six reconstitutions 
which would have allowed precisely this approach to be taken. More widely, 
English historical demography has stood aloof from the rich literature on 
continental communities which increasingly stresses the multi-layered 
interpretation and practice of courtship, marriage, household formation, and 
household operation.1 7 Explaining continuity and change in the English 
nuptiality regime continues to involve the core assumptions that while 
co-residence and economic support by close relatives could occur in the short 
term, the decision to marry was one governed by the basic economic outlook of 
the couple and informed by the need to achieve economic, and preferably 
spatial, independence from related households. Anything which either eased the 
1 5 To some extent these have already begun to emerge. See R. M. Carpenter, 'Peasants 
and stockingers: socio-economic change in Guthlaxton hundred, Leicestershire, 
1 7 0 0 - 1 8 5 1 ' (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Leicester, 1994) who found that 
female age at marriage in Countesthorpe was low and stable, at around 22.5, 
1700-1851 despite the fact that the township was next to Shepshed and had identical 
economic structures. This reflected 'an established tradition' (194) of early marriage. 
See also P. G. Spagnoli, 'Population history from parish monographs: the problem of 
local demographic variations' Journal of Interdisciplinary History 7 (1977), 4 2 7 - 5 2 , 
for sceptical comments on how far the experience of one parish can be used to 
represent that of another, even when they shared the same basic socio-economic and 
institutional characteristics. 
1 6 B. Hill, "The marriage age of women and the demographers', History Workshop 
Journal 28 (1989), 129-47 and A. Mackinnon, 'Were women present at the 
demographic transition ? Questions from a feminist historian to historical 
demographers' Gender and History 7 (1995), 2 2 2 - 4 0 . See also an important literature 
on what marriage as a concept meant to local communities in R. M. Smith, 'Marriage 
processes in the English past: some continuities' in L. Bonfield, R. M. Smith and K. 
Wrightson (eds), The world we have gained: histories of population and social 
structure (Oxford, 1986), 4 3 - 9 9 and D. Lemmings, 'Marriage and the law in the 
eighteenth century: Hardwick's marriage act of 1753' Historical Journal 39 (1996), 
3 3 9 - 6 0 . 
1 7 See for instance the different contributions to Journal of Family History 16 (1991) 
and the various essays in NEHA, Economic and social history in the Netherlands: 
family strategies and changing labour relations (Amsterdam, 1994). Also M. 
Mitteraur, 'Peasant and non-peasant family forms in relation to the physical 
environment and the local economy' in R. Rudolph (ed), The European peasant 
family: historical studies (Liverpool, 1994), 26 -47 . 
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level of resources needed for household formation, or gave young people more 
resources earlier in the life-cycle, could facilitate earlier marriage. 
And on the face of it, we could easily construct a list of such influences to 
explain the English nuptiality experience. Labour opportunities arising out of 
eighteenth-century English proto-industrialisation continue to be associated 
with the breakdown of traditional community structures, changes in the 
life-cycle timing of 'independence wages', the provision of active and passive 
incentives to earlier marriage, and a falling age at marriage.1 8 Alternatively, we 
might draw an association between earlier marriage and more favourable long 
term trends in real wage levels, or the development of income strands such as 
supplying the burgeoning eighteenth-century poor law. Indeed, spiralling relief 
expenditure itself has once again been linked to earlier marriage and higher 
fertility for the south of England, with the poor law seen as effectively 
underwriting the demo-economic consequences of early marriage. 1 9 Or the 
falling age at marriage might reflect a change in the two central variables of 
Hajnal's European marriage pattern - the nature of service and inheritance.2 0 
The decline of 'live-in' service in eighteenth and nineteenth-century England 
may have removed an institutional floor to marriage ages. At the same time, 
studies of inheritance patterns seem to reveal a gradual eighteenth-century 
focus of resources onto the nuclear family. Whether or not this reflected a 
concern to bolster the position of children in the marriage market, the net effect 
may have been greater certainty of inheritance for those born of parents with 
wealth to leave, and greater certainty of non-inheritance (and thus less reason to 
delay marriage) for those whose parents had fewer resources.2 1 
These are well rehearsed explanations and some are repeated in Wrigley et 
al. Deploying them in practice, however, generates three problems. First, in the 
English context at least there has been little empirical testing and we have only 
an imperfect knowledge of economic influences on micro decision-making. It 
is difficult to know how people put together a living, and more difficult to trace 
changes in the level of resources necessary for a young couple to be 
economically viable. Nor do we have a well developed idea of what 'leaving' 
the parental household actually meant in economic and spatial terms. And even 
if we had better coverage of these issues, the overwhelming problem of 
1 8 D. Levine, Family. However, see also the analysis of the proto-industrial 
communities of Coton and Winwick in R. Wall, 'Real property, marriage and 
children: the evidence from four pre-industrial communities' in R. M. Smith (ed), 
Land, kinship and life cycle (Cambridge, 1984), 4 4 3 - 8 0 . 
19 G. R. Boyer, An economic history of the English poor laws (Cambridge, 1990). 
2 0 See H. J. Hajnal, 'European marriage patterns in perspective' in D. V. Glass and D. 
E. C. Eversley (eds), Population in History (London, 1965), 103-43 , and H. J. 
Hajnal, 'Two kinds of pre industrial household formation systems' Population and 
Development review 8 (1981), 4 4 9 - 9 4 . 
2 1 See for instance J. A. Johnston, "The family and kin of the Lincolnshire labourer in 
the eighteenth century' Lincolnshire History and Archaeology 14 (1979), 4 7 - 5 2 . 
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identifying how much choice people had in the marriage market and how they 
balanced direct and indirect economic influences against questions of feelings, 
notions of duty and the opinions of others, would remain. Detailed discussion 
of segmented marriage markets and customary marriage norms by Rosemary 
O'Day provides a challenge to the notion of choice.2 2 The rediscovery of 
English kinship networks, and new work on contemporary meanings of the 
terms 'friend' and 'family' also raise important questions about the potential 
role of kin, friends, neighbours and others in the marriage decision and in the 
emotional and financial support of fledgling households.23 These issues have 
yet to be incorporated in a remodelling of English nuptiality explanations. 
Second, when implying motivations we have to be precise about exactly 
what needs explaining. In this case, why female marriage motivations changed 
in the mid eighteenth century, and why in particular a core of late marrying 
women disappeared and were replaced by a core of early marrying women. 
Against this backdrop, it might be misleading to think that balancing economic 
situation and prospects, the need for long term material security, the demands 
of parents for a say in the marriage process or for long term nursing and care, 
the need for love and affection, the desire for independence and the demands of 
fashion, friendship and work routines was done in the same way or had the 
same outcomes for all women, let alone for men and women jointly. Indeed, 
David Levine has explored the relationship between a range of material factors 
(inheritance, parental survival, birth order and wealth), and marriage ages, 
finding no relationship and concluding that the exact timing of the marriage 
decision took place 'for their own reasons'. 2 4 The idea that women in particular 
'married when they could not when they should' sums up much of this 
complexity.2 5 
Third, even if some combination of economic influences could be deployed 
to explain falling marriage age between the late seventeenth and the early 
nineteenth centuries, it is less certain that the same influences would also 
explain stable or rising ages nationally or at the level of individual 
R O Day, The family and family relationships, 1500-1900 (Basingstoke, 1994). 
See D. R. Mills, 'The quality of life in Melbourn, Cambs, in the period 1800-50' , 
International Review of Social History 23 (1978), 382^104, and D. Cooper and M. 
Donald, 'Households and 'hidden' kin in early nineteenth-century England: Four case 
studies in suburban Exeter, 1821-1861 ' , Continuity and Change 10 (1995), 2 5 7 - 7 8 . 
Also N. Tadmor, 'The concept of the household family in eighteenth century 
England' Past and Present 151 (1996), l l l ^ t O . 
D. Levine, 'For their own reasons: individual marriage decisions and family life' 
Journal of Family History 7 (1982), 2 5 5 - 6 4 . In later work, Levine was to refer to a 
'consensus' over marriage ages for different occupation and social groups in his 
proto-industrial community of Shepshed. See D. Levine, 'Proto-industry and 
demographic upheaval' in D. Levine, L. Page-Moch, L. A. Tilly, J. Modell and E. 
Pleck (eds), Essays on the family and historical change (Arlington, 1986), 9 -34 . 
D. Gaunt, D. Levine and E. Moodie, 'The population history of England 1541-1871: 
a review symposium' Social History 8 (1983), 139-68. 
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communities. English historical demography thus needs to think about a more 
flexible and wide ranging modelling of marriage motivations in the early 
modern period as it moves from macro-level observation to micro-level 
explanation. 
This article will contribute to this process. It will draw on nuptiality data 
from a project to reconstruct the demographic, economic, social, cultural and 
institutional life of two West Riding proto-industrial townships between 
1650-1820. In particular, it will concentrate on the experience of nuptiality in 
the township of Calverley-cum-Farsley, midway between Leeds and Bradford. 
A reconstitution for the township (1811 population, 2600) has been linked to 
poor law records, landholding and cottage surveys, and taxation records, 
yielding 6400 individual and 1700 enriched family life-cycles upon which to 
base an analysis of nuptiality. Using this data it will be suggested that declining 
marriage ages were not a uniform feature of eighteenth century English 
communities, and that in order to understand marriage motivations we must 
build upon the explanatory framework offered by Wrigley et al and incorporate 
questions of social mobility, the provision of nursing care, and sentiments over 
landholding. 
III 
The nature of landholding, social structure, and proto-industrial development in 
the township has been fully explored elsewhere.2 6 The local economy was 
intricately connected with the production of woollen cloth organised on an 
artisan basis. Independence from urban merchants, family based labour and the 
combination of agriculture and industry at family level were the three key 
characteristics of this system. Inventories suggest that at least 40 per cent of 
families had some connection with textile production even before 1750. 
Thereafter production expanded rapidly, and 70 per cent of occupations in 
post-1750 sources were linked to the textile industry. However, expansion of 
production was accompanied by a reorientation of work roles, as the 
preparatory processes in woollen cloth production were first mechanised, and 
then largely transferred from the domestic economy. Increasingly, clothiers 
were obliged to pay for things which previously would have been done by the 
younger or female members of their own family. This process meant that 
female work roles had to be modified, with female labour increasingly devoted 
to production of yarn and other textile products on a commercial putting out 
basis, or an involvement in petty trading.2 7 
2 6 S. A. King, 'Calverley und Sowerby. Die protoindustrielle Entwicklung in zwei 
Gemeinden Yorkshires (1660 bis 1830)' in D. Ebeling and W. Mager (eds), 
Protoindustrie in der Region: Europäische Gewerbelandschaften vom 16. bis zum 19. 
Jahrhundert (Bielefeld, 1997), 2 2 1 - 5 4 . 
2 7 For more on female work roles, see S. A. King, 'The nature and causes of 
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The land market in the township was largely leasehold, with the Lord of the 
Manor owning 80 per cent of all land, which was leased in 'clothier size' plots. 
By 1700 the average master clothier held between 12-18 acres of land. Even by 
1800 the average farm size remained between 12-15 acres. Most families had a 
realistic chance of holding land for part of their life-cycle, despite a substantial 
inflation of rents during the course of the mid-to-late eighteenth century and 
enclosure of the wastes and commons between 1750-1755. In terms of social 
stratification, 80 per cent of households were among the lower and middling 
orders when tax, landholding and other status yielding sources are linked 
together for the late eighteenth century.2 8 Social climbing and falling in this 
framework remained very much a reality; it was not uncommon to see the sons 
and daughters of substantial landholding families falling down the social scale 
at marriage, while the children of proletarians climbed into independence. 
Perhaps in part related to this experience, regular payments under the poor 
relief system in the township were consistently meagre, generally less than 2 
shillings per week throughout the eighteenth-century. Elsewhere, it has been 
suggested that this situation reflected the fact that kin were, and were expected 
to be, very active in helping individuals and families over life-cycle crises.2 9 
The marriage system in this artisan community was complex. Both male and 
female age at first marriage (Figure 1) were low and relatively stable. The 
female age at first marriage consistently undercut the lowest national mean, and 
the high initial ages and substantial eighteenth century falls identified for other 
proto-industrial areas by Wrigley et al cannot be seen here. 3 0 Moreover, the age 
range for brides was also very compact; 70 per cent of women ever married in 
the township fell within the age brackets 15-19 or 20-24 throughout the long 
eighteenth century. Detailed analysis of the experience of population 
sub-groups helps to illuminate and expand this broad aggregate picture. Figure 
2 presents male and female ages at first marriage by occupation of groom. 
While such a measure is an inadequate representation of the considerations 
affecting female marriage ages, different male occupations appear to have been 
associated with very different patterns of family economy and can therefore 
demographic change in an industrialising township: Calverley 1680-1820 ' 
(Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Liverpool, 1993). 
2 8 See P. Hudson, 'Proto-industrialization: the case of the West Riding wool textile 
industry in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries', History Workshop Journal 12 
(1981), 3 4 - 6 1 . 
2 9 S. A. King, 'Reconstructing lives: The poor, poor relief and welfare in a rural 
industrial community 1650-1830' , Social History 22 (1997), 3 1 8 - 3 8 . 
3 0 There is no evidence that this picture is simply a smokescreen, masking the fact that 
the implications of proto-industrial development for nuptiality had already worked 
through the demographic system prior to 1650. While it did have ancient roots in the 
township, the expansion of woollen cloth production in a truly proto-industrial sense 
was a phenomenon of the mid-to-late eighteenth-century. See H. Heaton, The 
Yorkshire woollen and worsted industries from the earliest times up to the Industrial 
Revolution (Oxford, 1920). 
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shed some light on this point of interest.31 Male clothiers and proletarianised 
textile workers were the earliest marrying grooms, as proto-industrial theory 
predicts. Women marrying clothiers and other men engaged in textile work 
were also the youngest brides, where we exclude the small sample (13) which 
makes up the 'Waged other' figure. Both male craftsmen and male farmers 
married relatively late, and farmers also took by far the oldest brides, almost 
three years older than clothier brides for the whole period.3 2 While most of the 
occupational differences were not large, there is at least the suggestion that 
women marrying textile workers and those marrying farmers may have had 
different motivations and chances. 
To some extent, however, these perspectives are potentially misleading. 
Sub-division of family reconstitution data sets inevitably leads to a 'small 
number problem'. More importantly, mean marriage ages represent the 
experience of people moving in opposite directions on the occupational and 
social ladders, and this might generate very different individual perspectives on 
marriage.3 3 An element of dynamism is provided by Tables 1 and 2, which 
record marriage ages according to occupational transition (between father and 
son for grooms and father and groom for brides) at marriage. Once again, this is 
an unsatisfactory way of approaching female marriage ages, but one 
necessitated by poor recording of female occupations in all English sources 
during this period. For all of its limitations, the approach is enlightening. Thus, 
while farmers appear to take the oldest brides, the mean age masks two very 
distinct experiences; the daughters of farmers who went on to marry farmers 
married early (mean 22.3 years), while the daughters of other occupational 
groups who married farmers did so very late (mean 27.2). Daughters of waged 
textile workers who married into established clothier dynasties and kin 
networks also experienced a small age at marriage premium compared to the 
daughters of clothiers who went on to marry clothiers themselves. The sons of 
waged textile workers who experienced upward occupational mobility at 
marriage had this similarly reflected in a marriage age premium when 
compared to the sons of clothiers who themselves went on to become clothiers. 
The opposite side of the coin is that the daughters and sons of clothiers sinking 
3 1 Thus, the wives of fanners and larger landholding clothiers appear to underpin wider 
attempts at petty production and service provision, while women marrying smaller 
clothiers and waged textile workers were tied into a family economy intimately 
bound up with textile production, and there is at least some evidence that wives were 
free to take in contract work from larger clothiers to supplement the family income. 
3 2 R. Wall, 'Real' found that the difference in nuptiality patterns between different 
occupational groups was less in age at marriage than the age and rate of remarriage. 
The sample is too small to test this reliably. 
3 3 Certainly P. Bourdieu, 'Marriage strategies as strategies of social reproduction' in R. 
Forster and O. Ranum (eds), Family and society (Baltimore, 1976), 117^14, found 
that the degree of expected and actual movement on the economic and social scale at 
marriage was vital in shaping the attitude to marriage partners, the timing of marriage 





down the occupational scale married very early indeed. Tables 3 and 4 take the 
analysis a step further and trace female and male (first) marriage ages 
according to social status transition (father-son for grooms and father-groom 
for brides) at marriage. For men, and to a lesser degree for women, falling 
down the social as well as occupational scale at marriage was associated (and 
partly intercorrelated) with youthful marriage. Retention of parental status or 
climbing was also, if less consistently, linked to higher marriage ages for both 
sexes. At family level, these tables translate into a situation where siblings 
might marry at very different ages depending on whether they were climbing or 
descending the social ladder. 
This is just one small study and cannot therefore be generalised. However, it 
does serve to suggest three things. First, that the English nuptial experience was 
probably less uniform than some commentaries imply. Second, that there is 
much to be learned about the mechanics of nuptiality by deconstructing 
community level statistics. And third, that when we do look at sub-groups 
issues of occupation, mobility, and perceptions of status become more 
important than macro-theories allow. This is precisely what O'Day, Hill and 
others were highlighting in their calls for a new look at nuptiality regimes in the 
English context. 
IV 
Explaining a nuptiality pattern which has little in common with either other 
proto-industrial areas or the national picture is rather more difficult than 
observing it. Two of the usual avenues for exploring nuptiality motivations 
have limited explanatory power in this framework. First, household economics. 
A crude longitudinal analysis of the likely costs of household formation for 
textile producers in the township can be seen in Figure 3, which covers rent, 
fuel, textile-making equipment, and household goods. The gross costs (ie 
uncorrected for inflation) rise significantly over the eighteenth century, such 
that a couple keeping the same social status as their parents might be expected 
to need the equivalent of £7-£8 if they were to be regarded as economically 
and spatially independent at marriage. This amount would be a little lower for 
those falling down the social scale, and rather more for those climbing. These 
figures make no allowance for land other than a small garden, and almost 
certainly understate the true cost of household formation at a level which was 
customary in the local community. To balance such expenditure, it is difficult 
to see where a young couple would get this level of resources either in the run 
up to marriage or its immediate aftermath. Opportunities for domestic, 
industrial or agricultural service before marriage were remarkably limited in the 
township, parish and local country.3 4 For those who could find opportunities, 
3 4 Elsewhere I have argued that English proto-industrial families redistributed young 
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wage levels are unclear. Joseph Rogerson paid fullers at his mill in the nearby 
township of Bramley eighteen shillings per week by the early 
nineteenth-century, but industrial labourers were rather less well paid on twelve 
shillings per week. 3 5 The wages of journeymen were rarely set down, and even 
at the time of the 1806 enquiry into the state of the woollen industry, positions 
labour around an unstable household system, rather than let it leave. See S. A. King, 
"The house that David Levine built: English proto-industrialisation and the unstable 
family' History of the Family (forthcoming). 
3 5 E. Hargrave and W. B. Crump (eds). The diary of Joseph Rogerson, fulling miller of 
Bramley 1812-1814 (Leeds, 1935). 
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of this sort were not common, with most production, according to the witnesses 
still conducted on a family basis. For those who remained in the parental 
household economy until much nearer marriage, the possibilities of 
accumulation were even less certain. While Wrightson believes that youths 
became progressively more involved in family decision making with age and 
over time, Bourdieu claims that few children would know the extent of family 
finances in the run up to marriage. This may have been especially true in places 
such as Calverley-cum-Farsley, where land, the most obvious and tenable 
symbol of family finances, was often rented rather than owned. 3 6 Here, as 
elsewhere, it seems likely that saving for marriage would not have yielded 
much in the way of monetary resources either for men or women. 3 7 
Economic prospects at the outset of a union did not inspire confidence in the 
ability to meet these potential bills either. Food and raw materials could 
theoretically be obtained on credit of varying terms from one week to two years 
plus, but degrees of accessibility depended upon occupation, age, reputation 
3 6 P. Bourdieu, 'Marriage', and K. Wrightson, 'The politics of the parish in early 
modem England' in P. Griffiths, A. Fox and S. Hindle (eds), The experience of 
authority in early modern England (Basingstoke, 1996), 10-46 . Also the discussion 
of autobiographical evidence by D. Vincent, Bread, knowledge and freedom: a study 
of nineteenth century working class autobiography (London, 1981). 
3 7 See S. A. King, 'The pinch of chance ? Paths to household formation in early modern 
England' International Review of Social History (forthcoming). Also D. Vincent, 
Bread. 
146 
and migratory status. Some household goods would presumably have been 
provided by relatives at marriage, and it is probable that some of the more 
expensive textile equipment could have been borrowed. However, against this 
we have to balance the fact that textile families were embroiled in a complex 
set of localised power relationships, with ongoing struggles on the income and 
expenditure front between clothiers and landlords, clothiers and merchants, 
service providers and clothiers, specialist production households and clothiers, 
and clothiers and local elites via mechanisms like the poor law. The outcome of 
this was uncertainty of gross and net income from month-to-month and 
year-to-year. If we assume that the average newly established couple would be 
able to produce one piece of cloth per week and that the wife (at least up till 
1755) was able to garner some income from the commons and other forms of 
petty production, then it is likely that average family income would not be more 
than sixteen shillings per week during the first year of marriage, perhaps less 
given the degree of pre-nuptial pregnancy which developed in the township 
during the eighteenth-century.38 The ongoing costs of everyday life and the 
household production process, combined with a growing burden of dependency 
in the initial parts of the childbearing life cycle, would seem likely to have 
swallowed up at least this amount, if not more. Such modelling is of course 
crude, but even if approximately right, it suggests that we should question 
whether many households in the township ever met the ideal of independent 
economic status either at formation or over the initial years of the family life 
cycle. A wide ranging debate about pauper marriages in the late eighteenth 
century press and pamphlet literature on the poor law, suggests that households 
elsewhere suffered from similar problems of viability. Against this backdrop it 
may have made sense to marry early anyway to at least start on the road 
towards the ultimate aim of dual occupation independent production.3 9 The idea 
that progressive eighteenth century marginalisation for southern agricultural 
labourers may have left equally little to lose by earlier marriage is also familiar. 
What is certainly true is that in Calverley-cum-Farsley the forces which shaped 
'economic outlook' in early adulthood were simply too complicated to evaluate 
in terms of a relationship between an abstract such as 'economic independence' 
and the decision on who to marry, when to marry or whether to marry at all. 
The second broad macro-explanation of marriage motivations which lacks 
wide explanatory power is inheritance. In an inheritance system where the vast 
majority of landed resources were rented rather than owned - as in 
Calverley-cum-Farsley - no systematic relationship between inheritance at 
Reported in P. Hudson and S. A. King, 'A sense of place: industrialising townships in 
eighteenth century Yorkshire' in R. Leboutte (ed), Proto-industrialisation: recent 
research and new perspectives (Geneva, 1996), 181-210 . 
For a similar situation in France, see L. S. Strumingher, 'The artisan family: 
traditions and transitions in nineteenth century Lyon' Journal of Family History 2 
(1977), 2 1 1 - 2 2 . 
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parental death and marriage of the inheritors in the reconstitution could be 
traced for either sex. It is rather easier to speculate on a link between marriage 
and ante-mortem asset disposal. Thus, in the will of Francis Knowles (1708), 
Lionel the eldest son received just forty shillings, by virtue of already having 
received £88 and land at an earlier stage of the life cycle. His marriage was 
celebrated in 1702 (at age 24), and the suggestion is that parental ceding of 
some wealth to the eldest son helped him to marry or supported a fledgling 
household depending upon when the transfer took place. This is just one 
detailed example to illustrate the wider point that 38 per cent of wills in the 
township suggest some economic power had been devolved prior to death. 4 0 
Actual or expected inheritance might thus provide a key to why marginal 
households were formed and how they were sustained. However, a regular flow 
of resources between the generations to aid household formation cannot have 
been a major explanation for low and stable ages at marriage. Lionel Knowles's 
brother, Abraham, received £70, a loom, some chests and some bedding from 
his father's will. He married in 1703 without apparently getting anything in the 
way of ante-mortem asset disposal, but at a similar age to his brother.41 More 
importantly, the family reconstitution suggests that 36 per cent of household 
heads who left wills only had female children alive at their death. Analyzing 
these wills reveals no ante-mortem disposal at all. The intergenerational 
passage of formal wealth may thus have oiled the wheels of the marriage 
market, but it must have been just one of a wider set of influences which 
informed the decision of who and when to marry, particularly for women. Data 
from this project can help to begin the task of reconstructing the patchwork. 
V 
In this context, the words of Joseph Lawson, an 1880's commentator looking 
back at his 1820's childhood in the parish, have some currency. He claimed 
that, 
The honeymoon is spent at home, in both bride and bridegroom working to 
buy a little furniture for housekeeping, very few people being able to furnish 
when they wed, but mostly live for some time with the girl's father. We 
speak ... now of the bulk of the working people in Pudsey at that time. 4 2 
The will of Francis Knowles, Borthwick Institute, York. 
For discussion of the relative inheritance chances of different siblings, see S. Staves, 
'Resentment or resignation ? dividing the spoils among daughters and younger sons' 
in J. Brewer and S. Staves (eds), Early modern conceptions of property (London, 
1995), 194-218 . 
J. Lawson, Letters to the young on progress in Pudsey during the last sixty years 
(Sussex, 1978 Repr.), 38. 
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Earlier in his book, Lawson claimed that, 
Married women with all their little gossip are very useful in getting the lads 
and lasses together. They plead their cause and help them to overcome many 
difficulties. They have a larger experience than the young folks and perform 
both for them and society at large, very important and beneficial service. 
They invite the opposite sexes to tea sometimes and speak a good word for 
their favourites. In fact, it may be said, and said truly, that a very large share 
of the courting is done by the married women, and even the old women do a 
large amount of work of this sort, for we know cases where matters of 
courtship have been made smooth and agreeable by the wise and shrewd 
diplomacy of some old woman. 4 3 
There are potentially many ways to read Lawson, but the idea that parents, kin 
and neighbours may all have been instrumental in shaping marriage behaviour 
at two levels - providing resources prior to and after marriage, and supporting 
the courtship process - is an attractive one. The depth of kinship in 
Calverley-cum-Farsley would certainly have facilitated active kin involvement, 
with up to four fifths of native marriage partners related to at least one other 
family in the township throughout the eighteenth century. Beyond this 
observation it is difficult to go. Lawson himself testified to deep neighbourhood 
and friendship networks in the parish, and even in the early eighteenth century 
the range of local lending and borrowing arrangements demonstrated by 
inventories is impressive. Concrete evidence of either economic support 
between households or proactive involvement of kin and others in the courtship 
process is elusive, however, and necessitates a more indirect approach. Thus, 
the fact that parents in particular were key players in the drama of marriage 
over and above simple provision of resources is suggested by disaggregating 
marriage age according to whether one or both parents were dead at the time of 
the marriage of their offspring. Table 5 deals with the marriage age experience 
of children from families where the parents either left no will or engaged in no 
pre-mortem asset disposal. From this sample, children both of whose parents 
were dead at marriage tended to marry later, just over one and a half years in 
the case of males and over two years in the case of females, than those who had 
both parents alive. The effect was less dramatic if one parent survived until 
child marriage, but still seems to have involved a marriage penalty. 4 4 Again, 
4 3 Lawson, Ibid, 34. 
4 4 D. Scott-Smith, 'Parental power and marriage patterns : an analysis of historical 
trends in Hingham Massachusetts' Journal of Marriage and the Family 35 (1973), 
4 1 9 - 2 8 , suggests that in pre-1750 Hingham Massachusetts parental death lead to 
earlier marriage because parents had much to lose in an economic sense by the 
marriage of their children and hence tried to hang on to them. R. Wall, 'Leaving' 
however traces the depletion of the size of the resident child group in a number of 
socio-economic contexts in England and finds little evidence of a sustained desire to 
hang on to children in this manner. The apparent circularity in our table which centres 
on the fact that earlier marryers would face lower risks of both parents dying becomes 
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there are a number of ways to interpret this evidence, but one is that, as Lawson 
discerned, parents were the key to obtaining marriage contacts and a trade, so 
that the beneficial effects of inheritance (if any) on marriage eligibility were 
more than offset by greater difficulty moving within the marriage pool where 
parents died. 4 5 Female marriage strategies would seem to have been particularly 
linked with parental survival, and it is notable that women with dead parents 
demonstrated a disproportionate tendency to marry farmers in the township. 4 6 
A further influence tending towards low and stable marriage ages in 
Calverley-cum-Farsley is in part related to the latter point, and centres around 
the speed at which households released young people for marriage. Richard 
Wall has provided considerable evidence of the timetable for young people 
leaving households in early modern England, but the picture is much clearer for 
men than for women and much clearer for agrarian than proto-industrial 
communities.4 7 In crude terms, it might be argued that certain types of 
household economy - for instance those dependent upon proto-industry 
organised along putting out lines or agrarian families which used only family 
labour - had an incentive to delay departure (and hence marriage) for a core of 
offspring who might compensate for declining parental efficiency. Equally, 
some types of production - proto-industry in particular - has often been seen as 
providing children with an opportunity to escape sooner than might otherwise 
have been the case, providing incentives for earlier marriage. The debate over 
these issues will be familiar. But there is a further aspect of child release which 
has been imperfectly considered. This was the duty of care for old parents, or 
for sick (not necessarily co-resident) kin, which task census returns, 
insignificant once we take account of the ages at which parents died in relation to the 
age at marriage of their children. 
4 5 L. Tilly, 'Linen was their life: family survival strategies and the parent child 
relationship in nineteenth-century France' in H. Medick and D. Sabean (eds), Interest 
and emotion: essays on the study of family and kinship (Cambridge, 1991), 300 -16 , 
suggests that the very fact that children stayed to marry in a place in the first place 
says something about the closeness of the relationship between that child and its 
parents, as opposed to the perhaps weaker relationship of those who left. Such a 
stance is more difficult to sustain given evidence that simple problems of distance 
were not sufficient to block close kinship ties in early modern England. See R. 
Trumback, 'Kinship and marriage in early modern France and England: four books' 
Annals of Scholarship 2 (1981), 113-28 . 
4 6 In terms of wider modelling, it would not be a giant speculative leap to suggest that 
the extent and functionality of kinship can also help to explain rising or falling 
marriage ages elsewhere. This might be especially true where what we are trying to 
explain is female nuptiality in a situation where the public persona of young women 
looked rather different to that of young men. Thus, the development of more dense 
kinship networks would tend towards lower female marriage ages through more, and 
more certain, courtship opportunities. A dilution of kinship would help to slow 
declining marriage ages or even put them into reverse. 
4 7 See for instance R. Wall, 'Leaving home and the process of household formation in 
pre-industrial England' Continuity and Change 2 (1987), 7 7 - 1 0 2 . 
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autobiographies, diaries and other data show to have fallen disproportionately 
to women. These duties could affect marriage ages in three potential ways. 
First, the sickness of a family member could end a current courtship. Second, 
long term sickness could lead to the postponement of serious courtship until 
late in the marriage age spectrum. Both influences lead to later marriage. Third, 
in some cases sickness could be so long term and repetitive, or old age so 
prolonged, that the opportunity of marriage was lost altogether.48 In 
Calverley-cum-Farsley, two things perhaps worked to control the effect of 
illness and dependency on marriage ages from an early date. First, we could 
argue that kinship opportunities allowed the spreading of care and hence the 
burden did not fall so exclusively on female children. Second, we could argue 
that while the poor law was parsimonious, it did not stint on medical relief even 
in the early eighteenth century. This too may have reduced pressure on women 
to postpone marriage when confronted by sick kin. Issues of retirement and 
provision of care in old age are considered below. Poor law data can also be 
used to test these influences. Thus, Figure 4 divides the eighteenth century into 
five sub-periods and contrasts the age at first marriage of female children in 
families which received long term of periodic poor relief for reasons of 
sickness, with the marriage ages of female children from families who never 
got poor relief of any sort.4 9 The differences appear substantial and while there 
is scope for different interpretations of this data, Figure 4 probably does go 
some way to proving that institutional provision of sickness relief freed young 
women who might otherwise have been expected to postpone or cancel 
marriage plans. 5 0 
A final aspect of intergenerational relationships also contributes to our 
understanding of nuptiality in Calverley-cum-Farsley and elsewhere. Figure 5 
4 8 Hence we can address the rate and age of marriage as parts of the same argument, as 
Levine suggested should be done. See D. Levine, 'Asymmetrical, non linear 
population dynamics' in R. Leboutte (ed), Proto-industrialisation, 9 3 - 1 0 6 . 
4 9 Migrants were excluded from this analysis for reasons explored more fully in S. A. 
King, 'Migrants on the margin ? Mobility, integration and dual occupation production 
in West Yorkshire, 1650-1820 ' Journal of Historical Geography 23 (1997), 304 -26 . . 
Families who received sickness relief for the first time after all female children were 
dead, married or might reasonably be supposed to have migrated, were also excluded. 
5 0 A combination of kinship and poor law support for the old and sick could also help to 
explain a wider conundrum - the loss of a late marrying and rise of an early marrying 
generation between the late seventeenth and the early nineteenth century. Thus, if we 
argue that medical poor relief became more accessible and generous over time, 
especially in the southern parishes which form the bedrock of the national analysis, 
the disappearance of a core of late marryers might become more understandable. 
More parsimonious attitudes towards such relief might in turn push up relief by 
forcing female children back into longer term care arrangements. There is not yet 
enough detailed work on the extent of kinship to place it adequately in this model, but 
where poor relief and wider kinship can be seen to bolster each other the burden of 




uses leases, estate surveys and manorial rolls linked to the demographic 
templates generated by family reconstitution, to trace the fate of farms recorded 
in the manorial survey of 1730. Two important points emerge from the analysis. 
First, a substantial proportion of the land which was 'lost' to the original 
occupier actually passed to kin or into joint tenancy, almost always with a 
family member. Where a joint tenancy was granted by the Lord or his estate 
steward, it was usually presaged with a text which said that the lease was 
granted for lands currently held and worked by the two (or more) people 
concerned, suggesting that land could be effectively held by two people for 
some time. Second, well over one third of all farms held in 1730 were still held 
by the same person is 1755. By the time the Manor was surveyed before sale in 
1755, the surveyor could draw on a substantial body of experience of individual 
tenants to provide detailed histories for the new owner, Thomas Thornhill. Yet 
even in 1730 over 80 per cent of the cohort of tenants were above the age of 
forty, and it seems unlikely that twenty five years later many of these by now 
aged figureheads would have been in a position to actively work land in a dual 
occupation system. While it cannot be proved definitively, it seems likely that 
old leaseholders had effectively given over control of leased land to offspring, 
continuing to trade on their reputation in issues such as lease renewal and 
extension. Individual leases which formalised long practised joint tenancies or 
which covered the amalgamation of plots held by one person and others 
nominally held by another party but worked by the applicant, are thus probably 
the tip of the iceberg of a range of other informal arrangements in this sphere. 
Whether these features amount to a thoroughgoing system of early retirement 
or not, the nature of the landholding ladder would seem to have had two 
essential effects." One is economic, in the sense that household formation did 
not apparently involve the need to own or control land, even though land was 
the basis for long term independence. The second effect is that land sharing (as 
well as social mobility) generated a degree of cultural attachment to land which 
has only been loosely appreciated thus far.52 The implications for the 
demography of Calverley-cum-Farsley are complex. Expectations of retirement 
allied with the kinship support reviewed above may well have made an early 
start on the proto-industrial family economy ladder highly desirable, even if 
this meant downward social mobility in the short term. 
Precisely because they were not proletarians and had aspirations to moving 
into the mainstream of dual occupation production, then, women and men in 
the textile trades would have consistently reinforced the township's early 
5 1 For a model of how to judge early retirement, see T. Held, 'Rural retirement 
arrangements in seventeenth to nineteenth century Austria: a cross community 
analysis' Journal of Family History 7 (1982), 227 -54 . 
5 2 For instance F. Hendrickx, 'From weavers to workers: demographic implications of 
an economic transformation in Twente (the Netherlands) in the nineteenth century' 
Continuity and Change 8 (1994), 321 -55 . 
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marriage regime. 5 3 Within this framework, 16 per cent of all eighteenth century 
families in the township would have had no close male relative, so that early 
retirement could only be achieved by creating new kin networks via (early) 
marriage of female children. In this sense, it is surely no accident that almost all 
of the men under thirty who appeared in Baines's directory of 1822 for the 
township of Calverley-cum-Farsley were related by blood or marriage to other 
more senior household heads in the township and directory ? Indeed, the 
development of occupational dynasties continually reinforced by marriage and 
often stretching over both community and social borders was part of the wider 
experience of West Riding proto-industrial communities.5 4 
VI 
Much more could have been done here to elaborate and analyze the 
demographic experience of Calverley-cum-Farsley in the light of new national 
approaches. Enough has been done however to draw a three clear conclusions. 
First, marriage ages in Calverley-cum-Farsley were low and stable, suggesting 
that the uniformity of English nuptial patterns should not be set in stone. 
Second, while the work of Wrigley et al has established a firm bedrock of 
inter-communal analysis, the explanation rather than the observation of 
demographic patterns requires detailed intra-community analysis. When we 
undertake this level of analysis, questions of differences in nuptiality according 
to occupations and social status take on some importance. Grand theories of 
demographic change simply will not do in explaining such experiences and 
shaping the wider research agenda. Third, and related to this point, marriage 
ages in Calverley-cum-Farsley were so low that ownership (if not control) of 
real property was at low levels for most of those marrying, whether they were 
falling or climbing on the social scale. Delving into the marriage motivations 
which underlay this marriage pattern raises important questions about how far 
couples balanced economic prospects, about the importance of institutional 
structures (such as the poor law) to the local nuptiality regime, about the 
importance of social mobility for marriage ages, and about the distinctive 
5 3 Those with simpler family economies and less opportunity for land sharing - for 
instance the farmers of the township - had a rather more conventional experience of 
marriage ages. 
5 4 P . Hudson and S. A. King, 'A sense'. The wider relevance of this experience is 
difficult to pin down. In many rural communities dispossession rather than aspiration 
may have helped to generate change in nuptiality. If however we frame the analysis 
slightly differently and concentrate not on land but on the issue of how 
intergenerational relationships changed over time and the longevity of traditional 
demographic and behavioral patterns - there may yet be scope for explaining why we 
observe such significant differences between the level of marriage ages in the 
different communities which make up the 'national sample'. 
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motivations or constraints on motivations which shaped when, where and at 
what age women married. As Sabean has noted of European communities, the 
path to economic independence was a long one, and if this is true then 
motivations for marriage are much more complex than we have allowed." 
55 D. Sabean, Property, production and family in Neckerhausen 1700-1870 (London, 
1990). 
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